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Since the late 1970s, what we today label ‘globalisation’ has altered many aspects of 
international law, not least international human rights law.  This has been reflected inter alia 
in increased calls for universal respect for human rights beyond a state’s territorial border. 
The challenges to territoriality in this regard does not only relate to the actions of states 
abroad, but also with respect to their regulation of the conduct of business enterprises over 
which they exert significant influence.  The chapter analyses the European Court of Human 
Rights’ jurisprudence and practice of the UN human rights bodies, and argues that 
extraterritorial human rights obligations have become an integral part of international human 
rights law.  It is held that what has been seen as ‘exceptional’ now represent ‘common 
practice’.  This conclusion is then applied to the discussion of the new treaty on human rights 
as currently being drafted.   
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X.1  Introduction 
The significant shift that occurred in international relations and particularly in international 
financial relations from the late 1970s onwards, commonly labelled ‘globalisation’, has had a 
profound impact on international human rights law. This part of international law has in the 
last few decades had to respond to realities in a world that is very different to the one in 
which the drafters of the Charter of the United Nations, and subsequent international human 
rights treaties found themselves. Some of the new challenges relate directly to concepts of 
territoriality. The post-Second World War environment was characterised by the domination 
of nation states, with emerging intergovernmental organisations aimed at solving 
international problems ‘in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields’2 
under the leadership of states. The last 30 years have seen a reduction in the role of the state 
in international relations, and the rapid growth of other actors on the international arena, 
including the increasingly powerful transnational corporations (TNCs).   
The challenge and shift in terms of territoriality relate to states’ human rights obligations. 
While the rights contained in international human rights law (as proclaimed particularly in 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights) are supposed to be universal in their enjoyment, 
traditionally states were considered to be under obligations to secure these rights for the 
citizens and residents within their physical territory only.   
In the  twenty-first century, where individuals’ lives are commonly impacted by the actions 
of foreign actors (whether another state, international organisations, or TNCs), this 
territoriality of human rights obligations has been challenged. It has been questioned whether 
suffering from human rights breaches committed by actors other than an individual’s own 
government, is not covered by human rights law due to its territorial constraints. In her 
important contribution to the human rights obligations discourse, Margot Salomon argues that 
‘the proper regulation of non-state actors, notably transnational corporations (TNCs), […] 
requires revisiting international standards and mechanisms to ensure that their activities are 
consistent with human rights’,3 and that doing so is necessary ‘if human rights law is to 
remain relevant’.4  
                                                          
2
  1945 Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter), Article 57. 
3
 Salomon 2007, at 11. 
4
 Ibid., at 12.  




In this chapter, I ask the question as to whether the interpretation of international human 
rights law through the practice of international human rights courts and committees now 
considers extraterritorial reach of state obligations to be an integral part of human rights law, 
and, if so, what this means for states’ obligations to regulate the conduct of business 
enterprises over which they exert control when they operate outside the territory of the state. I 
will first discuss the meaning of extraterritoriality in international human rights law from a 
theoretical perspective, and how such extraterritoriality relates to the obligation to protect 
individuals against human rights violations committed by private entities (Section X.2), 
before addressing how the concept of extraterritoriality has evolved in human rights practice 
(Section X.3). Much of the opposition to extraterritorial human rights obligations are based 
on the view that jurisdiction is territorial, and due to the wording of human rights treaties, 
obligations stemming from them are only relevant if a state acts within its jurisdiction. 
Therefore, much of this section will focus on how the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has interpreted the concept of jurisdiction, and also how this relates to the 
attribution of acts to states. The section will also address the views of various UN human 
rights bodies on the obligation of states to protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties. The final section (X.4) will address what the consequences of these findings will be 
for states’ obligations related to the regulation of activities of TNCs and other business 
enterprises, and how this may impact upon the work currently undertaken to draft a treaty on 




X.2 The Concept of Extraterritorial Obligations in Human Rights Law and the 
Obligation to Protect  
The term extraterritorial obligations I n international human rights law is now used to 
describe obligations related to the ‘acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its 
territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s territory’.6 
Obligations pertaining to such acts and omissions have been recognised for a considerable 
amount of time both within international human rights law, and also other areas of 
                                                          
5
 UN Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, 25 
June 2014. 
6
 Maastricht Principles on States’ Extraterritorial Obligations in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, adopted by a group of experts in Maastricht in September 2011, 
http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-
principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23, accessed 27 January 2017, Principle 8. 




international law, such as international humanitarian law,
7
 and international environmental 
law.
8
    
While the principles underlying extraterritorial human rights obligations have been 
recognised, the question as to what to call such acts and omissions of states beyond their 
territory has received significant attention and been subject to discussion for a number of 
years.
9
 Some authors have used the term ‘transnational obligations’; others ‘international 
obligations’, ‘shared obligations’, or ‘global obligations’.10   
The term extraterritorial obligations has been criticised from a number of different 
perspectives: First, some commentators hold that ‘extraterritorial’ implies that the obligations 
go just beyond a state border, rather than encompassing all the various locations where a 
state’s acts or omissions may have an impact.11 Others will argue that the use of 
‘extraterritorial’ gives too much emphasis on territory and gives the impression that 
obligations are considered to be largely confined to the physical territory of the state, rather 
than where a state has influence over the acts or omissions that result in human rights 
violations even beyond its territory.
12
 Furthermore, the use of the term extraterritorial has also 
been criticised as it has connotations to rather narrow use in US anti-trust law,
13
 or criminal 
law,
14
 and it is therefore not a concept that US lawyers readily associate with human rights 
law.  
The term ‘international obligations’ has been preferred by several UN bodies, including the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. For instance, the Committee holds, in 
its General Comment No. 14 on the right to the highest attainable standard of health, that:  
To comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties have 
to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent third 
parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these third 
                                                          
7
 International humanitarian law is in its origin extraterritorial in that it consists of legal regulation of conduct 
when a state is engaged in military conflict abroad.   
8
 Knox 2010, at 82. 
9
 Gibney 2013. 
10
 For a thorough discussion on the terminology used to describe the phenomenon often referred to as 
‘extraterritorial human rights obligations’, see Gibney 2013. 
11
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, The right to the highest 
attainable standard of health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 
UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 39. 
12
 Gibney 2013, at 40. 
13
 See for instance Beckler and Kirtland 2003, at 11. 
14
 Gibney 2013, at 41. 




parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and applicable international law.
15
  
However, to use international obligations as a term has been criticised as it may be confused 
with the regular horizontal obligations between states in international law, where treaty 
obligations are reciprocal and owed to the other states that have ratified a treaty. What 
extraterritorial obligations imply is rather that obligations relate to individuals within another 
state and whose human rights are being affected by acts or omissions by the foreign state. 
This relationship therefore depicts a different obligations’ relationship as the link between the 
right-holder and the obligation-holder transcends a territorial border, and therefore produces 
what can be called a ‘diagonal relationship’.16 Or in other words, international obligations 
could refer to the obligations one ratifying state has vis-à-vis the other states parties to the 
same human rights treaty, rather than to the population within those other states. Similarly, 
the use of ‘transnational’ obligations have by some been considered to indicate too much of a 
state-to-state relationship, rather than (again) the link to individuals in another state. Finally, 
the term ‘global obligations’ is used, but the reference here is usually applied to describe  
obligations of the international community as a whole and relates to structures in this 
community which may hinder or assist in human rights enjoyment worldwide.
17
  
While not necessarily an ideal term, ‘extraterritorial human rights obligations’ is now 
increasingly used by academics and practitioners. It also reflects the changing approach to 
territoriality and will therefore be the chosen term in this chapter.  
The next question to be addressed is how these extraterritorial obligations relate to the 
conduct of TNCs. Obligations pertaining to human rights are both of a negative and positive 
nature. This means that states need to refrain from interfering in rights’ enjoyment by 
individuals, as well as taking positive steps to ensure that human rights may be enjoyed by 
individuals. These negative and positive obligations have been further conceptualised into 
three main categories of obligations: the obligation to respect; the obligation to protect; and 
the obligation to fulfil. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights provides this explanation of the categories:  
                                                          
15
 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2000), General Comment No. 14, The right to the 
highest attainable standard of health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights), UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para 39.  
16
 Knox 2010, at 83.  
17
 Margot E. Salomon holds that ‘[t]he collective obligations of the international community of states […] 
pertain to obligations to ensure arrangements that are just, and thereby conducive to the fulfilment of the socio-
economic rights of all people’. Salomon 2007, at 182. 




Like civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights impose three different 
types of obligations on States: the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. Failure to 
perform any one of these three obligations constitutes a violation of such rights. The 
obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights. […] The obligation to protect requires States to 
prevent violations of such rights by third parties. […] The obligation to fulfil requires 
States to take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other 
measures towards the full realization of such rights.
18
  
While this tripartite classification of obligations was first articulated in relationship to 
economic, social and cultural rights, it is now generally accepted that all human rights carry 
both positive and negative obligations, and the classification is being applied to all categories 
of human rights. Thus, the question raised about states’ obligations to ensure that TNCs do 
not infringe upon an individual’s enjoyment of human rights relates in particular to the 
second category of obligations, namely the obligation to protect.  This category of obligations 
concerns the state’s duty to regulate the conduct of private parties, whether individuals or 
other entities. The UN Human Rights Committee has confirmed that this category of 




[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully 
discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of 
Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or 
                                                          
18
 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by a group of 
international experts in Maastricht, 22-26 January 1997,  
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html, accessed 22 August 2016, para 6. This 
categorisation is commonly used by international human rights bodies. For instance, in the General Comment on 
the Right to Adequate Food, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights confirms that:‘[t]he 
right to adequate food, like any other human right, imposes three types or levels of obligations on States parties: 
the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. […] The obligation to respect existing access to adequate food 
requires States parties not to take any measures that result in preventing such access. The obligation to protect 
requires measures by the State to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access 
to adequate food. The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means the State must proactively engage in activities 
intended to strengthen people’s access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, 
including food security. Finally, whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to 
enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that 
right directly. This obligation also applies for persons who are victims of natural or other disasters.’ UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 12, The right to adequate 
food (Article 11), UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, para 15. 
19
 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 




entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable 
to application between private persons or entities.
20
 
An essential part of this obligation is to ensure that business enterprises do not breach human 
rights in their operations. In the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGP),
21
 this has been framed in the recognition that ‘[s]tates must protect against human 
rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business 
enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress 
such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.’22 
To comply with the obligation to protect, states need to legislate and regulate the conduct of 
private individuals and entities, including businesses. This can be considered a requirement to 
carry out due diligence. Due diligence is a concept that is often used in business circles, and 
has, in the framework of the UNGP been defined as:  
An ongoing risk management process that a reasonable and prudent company needs to 
follow in order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how it addresses its adverse 
human rights impacts. It includes four key steps: assessing actual and potential human 
rights impacts; integrating and acting on the findings; tracking responses; and 
communicating about how impacts are addressed.
23
 
However, due diligence is not only relevant for the conduct of businesses themselves.  States’ 
obligation to protect requires legislation and regulation of the conduct of businesses to ensure 
that they do not threaten or breach human rights of individuals by applying a due diligence 
process. The importance of due diligence is that it focuses on the process of ascertaining what 
can reasonably be predicted as human rights consequences of certain actions or omissions. A 
legal definition of due diligence includes the proviso of ‘measure of prudence, activity, or 
assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised […] under the 
particular circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the 
                                                          
20
 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para 8. 
21
 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ Framework, HR/PUB/11/04, 2011. 
 
22
 Ibid., at 3.  
23
 UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, Glossary, Human Rights Due Diligence, 
http://www.ungpreporting.org/resources/glossary/, accessed 22 August 2016. 




relative facts of the special case’.24 In human rights terms, this can be considered as a 
normative function, rather than the de facto degree of control.
25
 Legislation requiring 
businesses to carry out such due diligence considerations regarding potential human rights 
effects of their operations should create accountability on part of these enterprises for 
potential failure to comply with such provisions. This would be one way for states to comply 
with their obligation to protect. 
The link between a state’s obligation to protect and extraterritorial human rights 
obligations concerns the question whether the content of this level of obligation goes beyond 
the territorial limitations of the state. In the commentary to the UNGP it is held that ‘[a]t 
present States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the 
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are 
they generally prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.’26 
In the following, I will consider the practice of the ECtHR and UN Human Rights bodies to 
ascertain whether such an interpretation of the relevant human rights treaties is as 
straightforward as the commentary to the UNGP imply or whether human rights obligations 
are now considered to extend extraterritorially to include a duty to regulate the conduct of 
entities other than the state (including TNCs) when they operate beyond that state’s territory.   
 
X.3. Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties by International Human Rights Bodies 
X.3.1 Background  
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the starting point for any treaty 
interpretation. This provision gives the general rules of interpretation, namely that ‘[a] treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’27 Thus, this 
provision establishes three general principles for treaty interpretation: the textual (‘ordinary 
meaning’); the treaty’s ‘context’; and the teleological (‘object and purpose’). While 
practitioners and academics have debated whether this listing in Article 31 is an expression of 
                                                          
24
 Black’s Law Dictionary Online, What is Due Diligence, http://thelawdictionary.org/due-diligence/, accessed 
23 August 2016. 
25
 De Schutter 2016, at 54.  
26
 UNGP,  at 3-4. 
27
 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT), Article 31. 




a hierarchy of interpretation principles,
28
 there seems to be a relative consensus that while all 
three principles should be applied in any treaty interpretation, the relative weight may vary 
dependent upon the character of the treaty, and the material content of it.
29
 Having said this, 
the view among scholars and international judges have been that the contextual or 
teleological principles cannot be applied in a manner that ignores the ‘ordinary meaning’ of 
the text.
30
 In addition, Article 32 provides for supplementary means of interpretation, which 
include the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.
31
 
It therefore becomes essential to address the relevant provisions in the various treaties to 
ascertain whether they contain text whose interpretation in accordance with the VCLT 
principles may confirm extraterritorial obligations. The most relevant provisions to be 
addressed are the general obligations provisions in each of the main human rights treaties.  
 
X.3.2 Obligations Terminology in Human Rights Treaties 
 
The first multilateral treaty to codify human rights law on a universal level was the UN 
Charter in 1945.
32
 The Charter clearly states general, yet fundamental, principles of human 
rights as being one of the purposes of the collective of nations joining together under the 
auspices of the new organisation. Even so, the Charter does not address in much specificity 
what the concrete obligations of the member states of the UN are. The most precise reference 
to the content of such obligations is found in Articles 55 and 56 read together, where the 
members of the United Nations ‘pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization’33 to achieve ‘universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion’.34 The reading of these provisions shows that the drafters envisaged more than 
domestic concern for human rights realisation, as ‘joint’ necessarily will involve efforts 
beyond at least one state’s border.35 
 
                                                          
28
 Çali 2014, at 528. 
29
 Ibid., at 533. 
30
 Jonas and Saunders 2010, at 581. 
31
 VCLT, Article 32. 
32
 See in particular articles 1(3), 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.  
33
 UN Charter, Article 56. 
34
 UN Charter, Article 55. 
35
 For further elaboration of the importance of these passages in an extraterritorial context, see Skogly 2010. 




X.3.2.1  Universal Human Rights Treaties  
 
Article 2 in both of the International Covenants on Human Rights from 1966
36
 contain their 
general obligations provisions. However, the content of the two vary considerably. Article 
2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
provides that the states parties to the covenant shall ‘take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation […] to achieve progressively the full realization of 
the rights’ recognized in the Covenant. On the other hand, Article 2(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains a rather different wording: ‘Each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction […]’ the rights recognised in the Covenant. It 
is important to note here that the ICCPR refers to both ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’, while the 
ICESCR refers to neither of these terms, but includes a specific reference to international 
assistance and cooperation.  
 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD)
37
 does not contain any references to territory or jurisdiction in its general 
obligations provision (Article 2), but refers to negative and positive obligations for ‘public 
authorities and public institutions, national and local’,38 who are under obligations to act in 
accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Similarly, Article 2 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
39
 
does not refer to any specific activity of an international character, focusing on obligations to 
take legislative measures on constitutional and other levels to prohibit discrimination against 
women.
40
 Other sections of Article 2 include obligations to take measures to prevent de facto 




                                                          
36
 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR); and ICCPR. 
37
 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195 
(ICERD). 
38
 ICERD, Article 2(1)(a). 
39
 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 UNTS 13 
(CEDAW). 
40
 CEDAW, Article 2(a). 
41
 See in particular Article 2(d) and (e) of CEDAW. 




In contrast to the previous two conventions mentioned, the International Convention against 
Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), is more 
explicitly restrictive in its wording:  
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures 
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
42
 
Thus, the text of this treaty specifies both territory and jurisdiction in its provisions detailing 
state parties’ obligations. By contrast, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)43 is 
explicit on obligations beyond the national setting. Article 4 of this Convention starts by 
stating that the ‘[s]tates Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and 
other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention’. 
This is non-specific in terms of territorial or jurisdictional application. The provision 
continues to provide that ‘[w]ith regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties 
shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where 
needed, within the framework of international co-operation’. ‘Such measures’ here refers to 
‘all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures’, and there is therefore no 
territorial or jurisdictional limitation specified for the obligations of states with regards to the 
rights in the convention, and it is additionally provided that for economic, social and cultural 
rights, these shall be implemented within the framework of international co-operation.   
 
The most recent comprehensive UN Convention – the Convention on Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD),
44
 has a very detailed general obligations provision in its Article 4. The 
first part of the article does not contain any territorial or jurisdictional limitations. 
Additionally, similar to Article 4 CRC, Article 4(2) CRPD states that: 
 
With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, each State Party undertakes to take 
measures to the maximum of its available resources and, where needed, within the 
framework of international cooperation, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of these rights […]. 
                                                          
42
 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 
UNTS 85 (CAT), Article 2(1). 
43
 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC). 
44
 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD). 




Furthermore, this treaty is unique in terms of universal human rights treaties as it contains a 
separate article confirming the importance and necessity of international cooperation for the 
protection of rights of persons with disabilities.
45
 This article details what state parties are 
supposed to do in terms of international cooperation to that end.  
 
As a preliminary observation going through the various treaties adopted under the auspices of 
the United Nations over the past 70 years, several treaties contain language that is open-
ended in terms of the reach of obligations, and some also include specific provisions 
requiring international co-operation when that is necessary.   
 
X.3.2.2  Regional Human Rights Treaties 
On the regional level, the four main conventions again differ with respect to the general 
obligations’ provisions. The first of these, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),
46
 provides in its Article 1 that ‘[t]he High Contracting 
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section I of this Convention.’ The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)47 has a 
similar provision in its Article 1, which reads: ‘[t]he States Parties to this Convention 
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms’. Thus, 
these two conventions include specific references to the ratifying state’s jurisdiction, but 
there is no mention of territory. The later regional treaty, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) of 198148 has a general obligation provision that does not refer to 
jurisdiction or territory: ‘[t]he Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, parties to 
the present Charter shall recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter 
and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.’49 Finally, 
the Arab Charter on Human Rights (ArCHR) of 2004
50
 returns to a very similar wording to 
that of the American Convention by stating in its Article 3 that ‘[e]ach State party to the 
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 CRPD, Article 32. 
46
 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended, ETS 
5 (ECHR). 
47
 1969 American Convention on Human Rights 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR). 
48
 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1520 UNTS 217 (ACHRP). 
49
 ACHPR, Article 1. 
50
 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, (ArCHR) translation by Dr. Mohammed Amin Al-
Midani and Mathilde Cabanettes, revised by Professor Susan M. Akram, 2004, 
http://www.eods.eu/library/LAS_Arab%20Charter%20on%20Human%20Rights_2004_EN.pdf, accessed 27 
January 2017 (ArCHR). 




present Charter undertakes to ensure to all individuals subject to its jurisdiction the right to 
enjoy the rights and freedoms set forth herein.’   
 
From this brief overview, it is interesting to note that only two conventions, namely the 
ICCPR and the CAT, specifically refer to territory when it comes to the ratifying states’ 
obligations to respect and protect the rights contained in the treaties. Three treaties (ICESCR, 
CRC and CRPD) include a specific mention of international assistance and cooperation for 
economic, social, and cultural rights; while five treaties (ICCPR, CAT, ECHR, ACHR and 
ArCHR) refer to jurisdiction in their obligations provisions. Finally, three treaties (CERD, 
CEDAW and ACHPR) do not make any mention of territory, jurisdiction or international 
assistance and cooperation in the text providing the general obligations for ratifying states. 
Thus, the common interpretation that obligations stemming from human rights treaties are 
limited to the territory of the ratifying state cannot stem from a textual interpretation of the 
treaty texts. In fact, the ICCPR and CAT would be seen as the only two treaties that have a 
text to provide for such interpretation. The textual justification for claiming that human rights 
obligations are (primarily) territorial must lie elsewhere, and this may be (as will be further 
addressed below) in a textual understanding of ‘jurisdiction’ as implying territorial 
limitations. This will be addressed in the section below analysing relevant case law.  
 
The work of the various international human rights bodies differ dependent on their mandate. 
The regional human rights courts deal with specific complaints, while few (apart from the 
UN Human Rights Committee) of the UN human rights bodies have a similar body of 
considerable case law to refer to. This does not mean that the work of the UN bodies is less 
significant, but rather that the focus of the work is different and consequently, so is the nature 
of their interpretation.  
X.3.3 The Evolution of Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Practice  
The most important issue in much of the case law that has developed regarding 
extraterritorial obligations of states relates to the question of jurisdiction. In spite of the fact 
that only some of the treaties have jurisdictional limitations, the question of jurisdiction (of 
the state and the international supervisory organ) is seen as essential to enable the relevant 
court or committee to address alleged violations of human rights abroad.   




Among the first cases to be heard relating to situations involving what we would now 
consider an extraterritorial application of obligations emerged from the ECtHR and the UN 
Human Rights Committee in the 1980s. As early as 1981, the UN Human Rights Committee 
heard the case of Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v Uruguay.
51
 In this case, Mr. Lopez Burgos, 
who was a political refugee in Argentina after being persecuted by the Uruguayan 
government for his trade union involvement, was abducted by Uruguayan security forces and 
forcibly taken back to Uruguay. He was subjected to treatment that amounted to torture. The 
UN Human Rights Committee found that Uruguay was in violation of its obligations under 
the ICCPR even though the activities had taken place outside Uruguayan territory. In this 
case, the Committee held that:  
[t]he reference in article 1 of the Optional Protocol to ‘individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction’ […] is not to the place where the violation occurred, but rather to the 
relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a violation of any of the 
rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred.
52
  
It further held that:  
Article 2 (1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to respect and to 
ensure rights ‘to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’, but this 
does not imply that the State party concerned cannot be held accountable for violations of 
rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, 
whether with the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to it.
53
 
In this early case, the UN Human Rights Committee thus confirmed that it is the relationship 
between the State and the human rights violation taking place, rather than the location of the 
act, which is of importance to ascertain whether a state obligation has been breached.  
A few years later, in 1989, the ECtHR heard the case of Soering v United Kingdom.
54
 In this 
case, the United States requested extradition of Mr. Soering – a German national – to be tried 
for alleged murder. He had left the United States after the alleged crime and gone to the 
United Kingdom. Mr. Soering held that he was likely to be given the death penalty in the 
state of Virginia if extradited and found guilty, and that the conditions surrounding such 
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sentencing would breach his rights under Article 3 ECHR.
55
 The UK held that this article 
‘should not be interpreted so as to impose responsibility on a Contracting State for acts which 
occur outside its jurisdiction’.56 The Court held that: 
the Convention does not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor does it purport 
to be a means of requiring the Contracting States to impose Convention standards on 
other States. Article 1 (art. 1) cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect 
that, notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State may not surrender an 
individual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of destination 
are in full accord with each of the safeguards of the Convention.
57
  
However, the Court continued to say that ‘[t]hese considerations cannot […] absolve the 
Contracting Parties from responsibility under Article 3 (art. 3) for all and any foreseeable 
consequences of extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction.’58 In its reasoning, the Court 
referred to the special character of the ECHR as a treaty for the ‘collective enforcement of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’, the ‘object and purpose of the Convention’ and that 
the interpretation of it should be consistent with ‘the general spirit’ of the Convention.59 On 
this basis, the Court found that the circumstances of the Soering case would ‘give rise to a 
breach of Article 3(3)’ if the applicant was extradited.60 The Court confirmed that while 
Contracting States are not responsible for human rights violations committed by non-parties 
to the Convention, there are circumstances when a state can foresee that their actions may 
have negative consequences on an individual’s human rights’ enjoyment, and that carrying 
out such actions will trigger responsibility of the state. This is particularly so when the right 
in question is one of the non-derogable rights according to the Convention.
61
 
These two early cases set the scene for treaty interpretation regarding the extraterritorial 
reach of human rights obligations of states. They represent the start of a process of 
consideration of the content of jurisdiction, how it relates to territory, and how it can extend 
beyond the physical boundaries of the ratifying state. These cases (some of which will be 
analysed below) raise questions of control over people and territory, and how acts and 
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omissions of the authorities of a state may produce effects outside a state’s territory which 
may cause human rights abuses and be the responsibility of the state. 
It would lead too far in this chapter to carry out a comprehensive analysis of all the relevant 
cases. Therefore, the chapter concentrates on some of the key cases before the ECtHR and 
how they have developed the understanding of ‘jurisdiction’, and also how the concept of 
attribution is relevant.  
X.3.3.1  Jurisdiction  
Following the Soering case, the next major case before the ECtHR receiving significant 
attention for establishing that the obligations of the convention may reach beyond the 
territorial borders of the ratifying state is the Loizidou v Turkey case from 1995.
62
 In this case, 
the complainant argued that Turkey had breached her rights according to Article 1 of Protocol 
1
63
  guaranteeing peaceful enjoyment of property. The occupation by Turkey of the Northern 
part of Cyprus resulted in Ms. Loizidou not being able to access her home and possessions. 
The government of Turkey argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case as 
the alleged violations had taken place outside the territory of Turkey and therefore outside its 
jurisdiction.
64
 The Court, however, did not accept this argument, as the large number of 
Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus clearly indicated Turkish control over the area.
65
 It 
consequently found that Turkey had breached the Convention, and held that:  
in conformity with the relevant principles of international law governing State 
responsibility, […] the responsibility of a Contracting Party could also arise when as a 
consequence of military action - whether lawful or unlawful - it exercises effective 
control of an area outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, 
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control 
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Hence, the Court here established that effective control of an area outside its territory will 
extend the reach of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR. Furthermore, such 
effective control can result from military occupation.  
Building on this case, the Court, sitting in Grand Chamber, heard the case of Banković and 
others v Belgium and others and delivered its judgement in 2001.
67
 This case was brought by 
survivors and relatives of deceased individuals of the NATO bombing of the television tower 
in Belgrade in 1999. The applicants held that the bombing and the resulting deaths 
represented violations of the right to life, as guaranteed by Article 2 ECHR, as well as 
violations of Articles 10 and 13.
68
 The respondent governments contested the admissibility of 
the case on the basis that the alleged victims were not within the jurisdiction of the high 
contracting parties in the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.
69
 After significant deliberations, the 
Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case on the basis that the actions taken 
by the European NATO member states happened outside the territory covered by the 
Convention, namely in the former Yugoslavia, and it was therefore outside the jurisdiction of 
the Court as understood by reference to Article 1. The case was consequently found 
inadmissible.
70
 This conclusion was different from that of the Loizidou case as Cyprus is a 
high contracting state, just like Turkey, and hence both states involved were parties to the 
treaty. The Court, thus, made a distinction between the area covered by the treaty, and 
territory outside this geographic area. It also determined in Banković that individuals in such 
external geographic areas were not under effective control of the respondent governments 
when they carried out aerial attacks resulting in death and serious injury.  
However, in spite of its conclusions in the Banković case, the Court confirmed that in 
exceptional circumstances the convention could have reach beyond the geographic territory 
of the members of the Council of Europe.
71
 
Since Bankovic, there have been a number of other cases where the Court has found that such 
exceptional circumstances exist and that the Convention therefore applies. Most notably, in 
the cases of Issa v Turkey
72
 and Al Skeini v UK
73
 the Court found that a state’s jurisdiction 
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within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR could be triggered  in situations of control both over 
territory and over persons within another state not party to the ECHR.
74
 Similarly, in cases 
brought against Russia and Moldova,
75
 the Court found that there were shared obligations for 
both Russia and Moldova for human rights violations that had taken place in Transdniestria – 
a region in Moldova where Russia has significant control. In all of these cases, the Court has 
confirmed that states may be under an obligation to respect the rights in the Convention in 
times of occupation or other military control over territory in another state.   
In a more recent case involving military activity, the Court dealt with the question of whether 
a state other than the formal occupying power may be considered to exercise jurisdiction. In 
Jaloud v the Netherlands,
76
 relatives of Mr. Jaloud brought the case after he was shot and 
killed by Dutch troops in Iraq in 2004. In this case, the Netherlands held that they could not 
be considered to be operating within their jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR, 
as they were not an occupying power, and their troops were deployed to Iraq on the basis of a 
UN Security Council Resolution. After careful consideration of the intricate structure of the 
international Stabilization Force in Iraq (SFIR) the Court found that:  
Although Netherlands troops were stationed in an area in south- eastern Iraq where SFIR 
forces were under the command of an officer from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands 
assumed responsibility for providing security in that area, to the exclusion of other 
participating States, and retained full command over its contingent there. 
77
 […] 
[Therefore] the Court cannot find that the Netherlands troops were placed ‘at the 
disposal’ of any foreign power, whether it be Iraq or the United Kingdom or any other 
power, or that they were ‘under the exclusive direction or control’ of any other State.78 
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Consequently, the Court found that the Netherlands ‘exercised its “jurisdiction”’ within the 
limits of its SFIR mission and for the purpose of asserting authority and control over persons 
passing through the checkpoint.’79 
In this case it can be argued that the Court showed an approach to the question of jurisdiction 
which is less formalistic in terms of formal power and more aimed at assessing the de facto 
situation on the ground.   
On the basis of these and other cases that involve the military, the police or security 
personnel’s activities in another state’s territory, there is now a strong recognition that the 
Convention has extraterritorial reach. In fact, in situations of occupation or custodial or other 
control over individuals by a state party acting  extraterritorially, the Court has found that the 
Convention regularly applies outside the territory of the ratifying state. However, the question 
becomes whether the jurisdictional reach is only applicable in situations where a state’s 
military or law-enforcement personnel are involved. If this was the case, the question of 
extraterritorial obligation to protect, through the regulation of private business entities’ 
operations abroad, would be largely responded to in the negative. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider if other forms of states’ international interactions will be covered by extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as well.  
Staying with the ECHR, there are a number of other cases that have been heard by the 
(previous) Commission and Court that deal with complaints stemming from different forms 
of states’ international interaction or cooperation. These have not received the same amount 
of attention from media and academic commentators, but they are still of interest to ascertain 
whether it is now commonly accepted that extraterritorial obligations go beyond the 
military/security spheres.  
Referring to its own case law, the ECtHR has held that extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
exceptional, but may exist when ‘the respondent State, through the effective control of the 
relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or 
through the consent, invitation, acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises 
all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by the Government’.80 This position 
is confirmed in Al Skeini, and in this case the Court added that: 
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where, in accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities of the 
Contracting State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of another 
State, the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of the Convention thereby 




Thus, the Court itself recognises that it is not only in cases of military occupation that the 
extraterritorial obligations of the ratifying states may be engaged.  For example, in Drozd and 
Janosek v France and Spain,
82
 which considered whether France and Spain exercised 
jurisdiction in Andorra as a result of French and Spanish judges practicing in that country, the 
Court held that France and Spain could not be considered to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in this context, as the judges were not ‘subject to supervision by the authorities of 
France and Spain’.83 However, the Court accepted that if such supervision had been carried 
out, then France and Spain could have been responsible ‘because of acts of their authorities 
producing effects outside their own territory’.84 Furthermore, in X and Y v Switzerland,85 
concerning a treaty incorporating Lichtenstein into Switzerland’s customs area, and where the 
question was whether decisions by the Swiss authorities had an effect outside Swiss territory, 
the then European Commission on Human Rights held that ‘[a]cts by Swiss authorities with 
effect in Liechtenstein bring all those to whom they apply under Swiss jurisdiction within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.’86 
Similarly, the Manoilescu and Dobrescu v Romania and Russia
87
 case concerned the 
restitution of property to two Romanian nationals. Their property had been transferred to the 
Romanian State after the Second World War, and was later subject to a property exchange 
with the Soviet Union (ultimately transferred to the Russian Federation). It was confirmed in 
1994 that the property would be used by the Russian Embassy in Romania. The court found 
the complaint inadmissible, and the applicants had not been able to show that they were 
within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in this case. Nevertheless, the Court in its 
deliberations held that:  
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[e]ven in the absence of effective control of a territory outside its borders, the State still 
has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, 
economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance 




Indeed, in this case, the Court said that the principle quoted above was a broadening of its 
earlier position that the exceptional circumstances only referred to situations of effective 
control through ‘military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the 
government of that territory’.89 
 
X.3.3.2  Attribution of Acts to the State 
While it may be concluded that the Court has accepted that jurisdiction may extend beyond 
the territorial borders of a ratifying state, the above discussion has not dealt with one of the 
main conditions brought forward by the ECtHR, namely that of attribution. As quoted in the 
Al Skeini case, the Court held that ‘the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of 
the Convention thereby incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable to it rather 
than to the territorial State’.90 When acts are carried out by the military or the police, the 
question of attribution to the state is relatively straightforward. However, if acts are done by 
private entities, the question becomes more complex. For the purpose of the present chapter, 
the question becomes whether the requirement of attribution to the state may be satisfied in 
situations of transnational corporations’ behaviour abroad.   
In the commentary to the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts from 2001,
91
 it is held that ‘the general rule is that 
the only conduct attributed to the State at the international level is that of its organs of 
government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those 
organs, i.e. as agents of the State’,92 and ‘[a]s a corollary, the conduct of private persons is 
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not as such attributable to the State’.93 Thus, the regular understanding of acts or omissions 
attributable to the state would not be those engaged in by private parties, including private 
business enterprises, and it could be concluded that this understanding of attribution would 
prevent responsibility for a state related to the acts of private enterprises. However, the 
distinction between the actions of private parties and the state is not necessarily that firm. 
Notwithstanding the clear definition of attribution as quoted above, the commentary to the 
Articles also confirms that ‘a State may be responsible for the effects of the conduct of 
private parties, if it failed to take necessary measures to prevent those effects’,94 and that the 
question of attribution relates both to actions and omissions.
95
 
Attribution in the context of extraterritorial obligations should be seen in light of two 
concepts already mentioned: ‘acts producing effects abroad’ and ‘due diligence’. In several 
cases, including the Jaloud case, the Court has held that ‘a Contracting State’s jurisdiction 
under Article 1 may extend to acts of its authorities which produce effects outside its own 
territory’.96  
 
While it is rare that negative acts by TNCs can be directly attributed to the home state, their 
acts should be seen in the context of potential failure ‘to take necessary measures to prevent 
those effects’.97 If a state is in a position to regulate the conduct of a company’s actions 
abroad, but fails to do so, and this omission results in human rights abuses, the question of 
responsibility upon the state may be raised. This is the approach taken by the UNGP where, 
in the commentary to the Principles, it is held that: 
[s]tates are not per se responsible for human rights abuse by private actors. However, 
States may breach their international human rights law obligations where such abuse can 
be attributed to them, or where they fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, 
punish and redress private actors’ abuse.98 
On the basis of the brief consideration of the case law above, some general observations can 
be made. First, the ECtHR has confirmed that while jurisdiction is primarily territorial, there 
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are exceptional circumstances whereby the jurisdictional reach goes beyond the territory of 
the ratifying state, and indeed also the territory covered by the total membership of the 
Council of Europe. Second, these exceptional circumstances do not only cover situations of 
occupation or other forms of effective control over territory. Control over persons is also 
included, and so are actions of states that produce human rights effects outside their territory. 
Third, the Court has confirmed that contracting parties have a positive duty to take ‘the 
diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that is in its power to take […] to secure 
[…] the rights guaranteed by the Convention’.99 Finally, attribution of actions may be made 
to states even if they have been carried out by private parties. The significance of these 
developments in case law for the question of obligations of states to regulate the conduct of 
TNCs will be further addressed in section X.4 below.  
 
X.3.4 The United Nations Bodies 
Most of the work of UN bodies in this area comes in the form of Concluding 
Observations to state reports, General Comments from UN Committees, or reports from 
Special Rapporteurs. While not considered legally binding decisions, such statements are 
considered to represent authoritative interpretations of the various treaties. There is a growing 
trend among the UN bodies to address extraterritorial obligations of states in these 
documents, including those related to states’ regulation of the conduct of private parties. The 
Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights monitors UN pronouncements on 
extraterritorial human rights obligations, and has in its latest collection documented 41 
references to such obligations since 2010.
100
 These pronouncements come from a large 
variety of UN human rights bodies, including: the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, The Human Rights Committee; the Committee on Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women; the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child; several special rapporteurs (both on civil and political 
and on economic, social and cultural rights) through the Special Procedures, and the 
Universal Periodic Review.   
As noted in section X.3.2 above, only the ICCPR and the CAT refer to both ‘jurisdiction’ and 
‘territory’ in their general obligations provisions. The question raised in the interpretation of 
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these provisions is whether this wording implies that the two concepts should always be 
considered in conjunction with each other, or whether they are considered separate: 
‘jurisdiction’ on the one hand and ‘territory’ on the other. If that were to be the case, one 
could expect that the wording used in the treaties would have been ‘jurisdiction or territory’ 
rather than ‘jurisdiction and territory’, as stated in the ICCPR. However, in General 
Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee does not take this view. Quite the 
contrary, they hold that:  
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant 
rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in 
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if 








The UN Committee against Torture has also addressed the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ and 
‘territory’ in its General Comment on Article 2 of the Convention. They have not quite taken 
the same specific view on the separation of the two concepts as the UN Human Rights 
Committee has done. However, they clearly do not interpret these two concepts in a narrow 
or restrictive manner. The General Comment provides that:  
[t]he Committee […] understands that the concept of ‘any territory under its jurisdiction,’ 
linked as it is with the principle of non-derogability, includes any territory or facilities 
and must be applied to protect any person, citizen or non-citizen without discrimination 
subject to the de jure or de facto control of a State party.
103
 
Furthermore, the General Comment goes on to state that:  
Article 2, paragraph 1, requires that each State party shall take effective measures to 
prevent acts of torture not only in its sovereign territory but also ‘in any territory under 
its jurisdiction.’ The Committee has recognized that ‘any territory’ includes all areas 
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where the State party exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de 
facto effective control, in accordance with international law. The reference to ‘any 
territory’ in article 2 […], refers to prohibited acts committed not only on board a ship 
or aircraft registered by a State party, but also during military occupation or 
peacekeeping operations and in such places as embassies, military bases, detention 
facilities, or other areas over which a State exercises factual or effective control. The 
Committee notes that this interpretation reinforces article 5, paragraph 1 (b), which 
requires that a State party must take measures to exercise jurisdiction ‘when the alleged 
offender is a national of the State.’ The Committee considers that the scope of ‘territory’ 
under article 2 must also include situations where a State party exercises, directly or 
indirectly, de facto or de jure control over persons in detention.
104
 
As is evident from these two quotes, the Committee against Torture does not see the 
references to ‘territory’ and ‘jurisdiction’ in the Convention in any way to signify a strict 
adherence to the physical territorial boundaries of the ratifying state. They understand these 
terms with reference to both de jure and de facto control not only over territory, but indeed 
also over persons – and these persons may be in areas far away from the actual territory of the 
state, including in foreign states’ territory in terms of peace keeping or detention during 
occupation.  It is also emphasised that this control can be either direct or indirect.  
These two committees monitor the implementation of treaties that have more restrictive 
language on territorial jurisdiction than the other treaties, including the ECHR as discussed 
above. Yet, they have accepted a broader interpretation of situations that may involve the 
jurisdiction of the state party in question. The way in which this may impact on the role of the 
state regarding the regulation of private parties, was also confirmed by the UN Human Rights 
Committee in paragraph 8 of General Comment No. 31.
105
 
Beyond the question of jurisdiction, many of the UN human rights bodies have given 
attention to situations where states should take measures to protect individuals from negative 
effects of acts taken by private parties over which the state has control or significant 
influence. It is not possible to give a full account of the statements by these bodies in this 
article, but a few should be mentioned for illustration.  
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For instance, in its concluding observations from 2016 on the report from the United 
Kingdom, the CRC expressed its concern about  the effect of the UK’s development 
cooperation, where they contribute to ‘for-profit schools’, and that the right to education may 
be in jeopardy.
106
 The UN Human Rights Committee in its concluding observations on the 
report by the United States in 2006, held that it ‘notes with concern the restrictive 
interpretation made by the State party of its obligations under the Covenant, as a result in 
particular of […] its position that the Covenant does not apply with respect to individuals 
under its jurisdiction but outside its territory’.107  
The Special Rapporteur on the rights of peaceful assembly and of association held that states 
shall:  
(c) Take appropriate measures to meet extraterritorial obligations, particularly by 
providing access to remedy for victims of violations of the rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and of association; measures should include but are not limited to: 
[…] 
(ii) Enacting, implementing and enforcing laws that prohibit and provide 
penalties for conduct by corporations that violates human rights abroad;    
(iii) Ensuring that trade and other agreements on investment in natural 
resource exploitation activities, whether concluded bilaterally or 
multilaterally, recognize and protect the exercise of peaceful assembly and 
association rights for affected individuals and groups[.]
108
  
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights held in a statement from 2011 
that ‘[s]tates parties should […] take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by 
corporations which have their main offices under their jurisdiction, without infringing the 
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sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the host States under the Covenant.’109 And in 
recent concluding observations on the report from Canada, the same Committee, held that: 
The Committee is concerned that the conduct of corporations registered or domiciled in 
the State party and operating abroad are, on occasions, negatively impacting on the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights by local populations. […] The Committee recommends that 
the State party strengthen its legislation governing the conduct of corporations registered 
or domiciled in the State party in their activities abroad, including by requiring these 
corporations to conduct human rights impact assessments prior to making investment 
decisions. It also recommends that the State party introduce effective mechanisms to 
investigate complaints filed against these corporations, and adopt the necessary legislative 
measures so as to facilitate access to justice before domestic courts by victims of these 
corporations’ conduct.110  
In its Concluding Observations regarding China, the Committee expressed its concern ‘about 
the lack of adequate and effective measures adopted by the State party to ensure that Chinese 
companies, both State-owned and private, respect economic, social and cultural rights, 
including when operating abroad’ and recommended that China establish a regulatory 
framework for Chinese companies to ‘ensure that their activities promote and do not 
negatively affect the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural human rights’; and that the 
country should ‘[a]dopt appropriate legislative and administrative measures to ensure the 
legal liability of companies and their subsidiaries operating in or managed from the State 
party’s territory regarding violations of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of 
their projects abroad’.111   
The UN Human Rights Committee has expressed its satisfaction that Germany has 
established the opportunity for remedies against German companies acting abroad when they 
are in contravention of relevant human rights standards. However, the Committee has noted 
that the standards may not always be sufficient. Therefore the State party was asked to set out 
clearly the expectation that all business enterprises ‘domiciled in its territory and/or its 
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jurisdiction respect human rights standards in accordance with the Covenant throughout their 
operations. It is also encouraged to take appropriate measures to strengthen the remedies 
provided to protect people who have been victims of activities of such business enterprises 
operating abroad.’112  
From the discussions above it is shown that the ECtHR has the most extensive case law when 
considering extraterritorial reach of jurisdiction, while the UN bodies have addressed 
specifically the question of jurisdiction for those treaties that have jurisdictional limitation, 
and have found that jurisdiction is not limited to territory. In addition to considering the 
specific issue of jurisdiction, other monitoring bodies in the UN have clearly taken the 
position that the obligation to protect includes states’ obligations to ensure regulation of the 
conduct of private parties over which they exercise control or influence. This conclusion is in 
accordance with the approach taken by the drafters of the Maastricht Principles of 
Extraterritorial Obligations in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which in its 
preamble states that ‘the Maastricht Principles do not purport to establish new elements of 
human rights law. Rather, the Maastricht Principles clarify extraterritorial obligations of 
States on the basis of standing international law.’113 
The final section of the article will consider how these findings may impact upon the new 
initiative to draft a treaty on business and human rights, which is currently being undertaken.  
 
X.4 Impact on the New Treaty on Business and Human Rights  
In order to link the question of jurisdiction and the obligation to protect, there are a number of 
different issues that need to be connected. The ECtHR has confirmed that jurisdiction is not 
uniquely territorial, and this is indeed in line with the common understanding of jurisdiction 
in international law, which accepts that prescriptive jurisdiction does not have territorial 
limitations, as long as it is exercised in accordance with international law.
114
 Thus, states are 
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free to legislate or otherwise regulate for the conduct of TNCs when operating abroad. It is 
the right of states to include whatever they want in the legislation regulating the 
establishment or incorporation of businesses within their national legislative setting. This 
right to regulate was also confirmed in the commentary to the UNGP, as referred to above.
115
 
However, the right to regulate does not necessarily imply an obligation to regulate. Therefore, 
the understanding of jurisdiction as not preventing regulation is important, but not sufficient 
to generate an obligation. The source of such obligation is found in the tripartite classification 
of human rights obligations combined with the interpretation of the reach of the rights 
guaranteed in the various human rights treaties. As has been demonstrated above, the ECtHR 
and the UN human rights bodies are increasingly accepting that the obligation to protect 
includes obligations that go beyond the national physical borders of a ratifying state.  
De Schutter argues that the human rights obligation to protect includes the obligation for 
states to ensure that TNCs do not breach human rights of individuals when they operate in a 
country other than their home state.
116
 He criticises the weak formulation of the UNGP in this 
regard, and holds that a new legally binding instrument could clarify and be explicit on the 
extraterritorial reach of the obligation to protect.
117
 If included, the new treaty will confirm 
existing obligations and make them explicit, rather than breaking new ground in human rights 
obligations.   
Explicit recognition will normalise extraterritorial obligations even further than what they are 
now. There is still much state opposition to accepting these obligations, and making them 
explicit will demystify them and bring them into mainstream human rights discourse. The 
distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in relationship to regulation of 
TNCs will be useful in explaining what is expected of states in this context. To prescribe 
regulation of conduct for TNCs over which a state exercises authority no matter where these 
businesses operate is clearly within the jurisdiction of the home state. To enforce such 
regulation in situations where the host state fails to do so is also within the jurisdiction of the 
home state.  
Furthermore, an inclusion of the obligation to protect (domestically as well as 
extraterritorially) will provide for the state’s central role in ensuring that TNCs and other 
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businesses do not violate human rights. One of the dangers with the proposed new treaty 
could be that the role of the state is taken out of the equation, and that the TNCs are given 
direct obligations based on the treaty only. In this respect, states may feel that they have done 
what they need to do to protect individuals from human rights violations carried out by the 
TNCs just by ratifying the treaty, and then leave it up to the TNCs and whatever 
implementation structures will be provided for in the treaty to deal with violations of human 
rights by TNCs.. Thus, by including the state and its obligations to regulate the conduct of the 
TNCs over which they exercise home-state jurisdiction explicitly, the treaty will ensure that 
states may be held accountable if they fail to regulate the conduct of TNCs and to hold these 
TNCs to such standards. This does not mean that TNCs may not be held directly accountable 
under the terms of the treaty; a combination of direct and indirect accountability of TNCs 
could be possible within one treaty in the same sense of subsidiarity as is employed in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.
118
 
As has been argued throughout this chapter, the acceptance of extraterritorial obligations as 
part of already exciting human rights treaties is now commonly the case of the bodies 
implementing and supervising international human rights treaties. By making this explicit in 
the text of the new treaty it will not revolutionise human rights law, but it will bring universal 
protection forward. The fact that states may initially oppose this concept explicitly in a treaty 
does not mean that it is not already recognised in international law. After all, international 
human rights law aims to regulate the conduct of states, and has traditionally been altering the 
practice of states in how they treat individuals. The obligations that this legal regime carry 
will by necessity curtail the freedom of manoeuvre of states. It is therefore to be expected that 
they oppose what at times is perceived to be adding more obligations upon them.  
Consequently, it is necessary to emphasise that these are obligations that come from the 
object and purpose of the treaties they have already ratified. The globalization that has taken 
place over the past few decades makes a strengthening of the protection of individuals from 
human rights abuses committed both by states and non-state actors imperative. By including 
such obligations explicitly in the new treaty, the drafters can ensure that it remains relevant 
for the lives people lead in the twenty-first century.   
X.5 Conclusions 
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International human rights law is dynamic and needs to respond to changing societal realities. 
Human rights treaties have been recognised as living instruments by courts and academics.
119
 
The recognition that human rights obligations may be extended to individuals other than 
those within the territorial boundaries of a state, has been developing over the past few 
decades. The work of the UN human rights bodies demonstrates that the extraterritorial 
application of the universal human rights treaties is now an integral part of their operations. 
However, by emphasising that extraterritorial obligations are only relevant in exceptional 
circumstances, the ECtHR gives the impression that applying such obligations does not 
represent ‘business as usual’, but rather that it is only on rare occasions that states need to 
consider the effect of their decisions or actions, or omissions, on the human rights enjoyment 
of individuals beyond their borders. While the content of obligations may be of an 
extraterritorial nature, the use of such terminology by the Court may in fact underscore an 
exceptionalism that is not a reality in law. As has been demonstrated, the ECtHR and other 
international bodies now find, in a large variety of situations, that states can be held 
accountable for conduct beyond their borders, and the ‘exceptional’ seems to have become 
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